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CIATION, a corporation; KENNE-
COTT COPPER CORPORATION, a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation; and, 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, a public corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Intervenors-Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a municipal cor-
poration of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State Engi-
neer of the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation; KENNE-
COTT COPPER CORPORATION, a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation; and, 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, a public corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Intervenors-Appellants. 
Case No. 14,023 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES now the respondent, Provo City, by and through its at-
torney, Jackson Howard, pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and petitions the Court for a rehearing of 
the above-mentioned cause and alleges that the Court erred in the 
following particulars: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT, PROVO CITY, 
RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION 
NO. 3686. 
The Court's prior decision appears to be based on the assump-
tion that the respondent received notice of the issuance of 
Certificate No. 3686. There is nothing in the record which would 
substantiate that fact. Respondent has found no record that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would establish that it ever did receive notice of the issuance 
of the certificate and, therefore, denies that it received notice 
and also denies that the certificate was found in its archives. 
The reason no protest was entered by Provo City was because 
it undoubtedly never received the certificate when it was issued. 
It is also obvious that the Provo River Commissioner never re-
ceived notice of the issuance of the certificate because he con-
tinued to deliver approximately 784 acre/feet of water to Provo 
City. The burden of proof is upon the appellants to show that 
Provo City did, in fact, receive the certificate. That is an 
issue that can only be determined by remanding this cause to the 
trial court for a complete hearing. 
Since there has been no trial in this case, and because 
there was no affidavit from either party on this subject, this 
particular question is a justiciable issue of fact. Because this 
is a material question* disputed and justiciable, the Court 
should remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING PREVIOUS CASE LAW THAT WOULD 
ALLOW THE REFORMATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION. 
The Court's prior decision rejects its prior authorities 
that would permit the reformation of a certificate of appropria-
tion that was erroneously issued. Even if the appellants could 
prove, which they cannot, that respondent received Certificate 
No. 3686, the prior case law established by this Court would 
still allow an equitable proceeding based upon the principles of 
mistake. Respondent has cited the case of Warren Irrigation Co. 
." • - 2 - . • 
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v. Charlton, 58 Utah 113, 197 P.2d 1030 (1921), on page 14 of its 
prior brief. The issue there was whether an opposing party could 
attack or set aside a certificate of appropriation of another. 
This Court held that an opposing party could not attack the cer-
tificate, but that the party with a direct interest in the cer-
tificate (which would include the party to whom it is issued) 
could have a certificate reformed because of a mistake, fraud, or 
misconstruction of the law. This Court has now rejected its 
prior position in Warren Irrigation Co. with no discussion as to 
why that principle is no longer applicable or considered good 
law. The Warren Irrigation Co. case was decided in 1921, when 
the same 60-day review period for decisions of the State Engineer 
was in effect. (See Complied Laws of Utah, §3459, 1917) 
The result of Warren Irrigation Co. and the prior decision 
in this case is to make a certificate of appropriation a "sacred 
cow" that cannot be attacked upon any grounds. Warren Irrigation 
Co. states that a certificate of appropriation cannot be attacked 
collaterally, and the decision in this case says that a cer-
tificate cannot be directly attacked if an action is not brought 
within 60 days. Such is the result, regardless of fraud, mistake 
of fact, mistake of law, estoppel or other equitable principles. 
Mistake of fact and misconstruction of the law are the ob-
vious grounds upon which this cause of action should be remanded 
to the trial court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S DECISION, IN EFFECT, ESTABLISHED A NEW AND 
INSIDIOUS LAW OF NOTICE WITH RESPECT TO WATER RIGHTS. 
A. One item of notice that was not treated by the Court is 
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whether the State Engineer's past and present practice of issuing 
its "Memorandum Decisions" and its "Certificates of Appropriation 
is proper. The present and past practice of the State Engineer 
was to advise the protestants and applicants involved in a "Mem-
orandum Decision". This decision has always been accompanied by 
written notice warning those involved of their right to appeal 
the decision to the district court, if such is done within 60 
days. In this case, when the final certificate of appropriation 
was issued, no such warning notice was given to Provo City or any 
other interested party. If the procedure in this case is given 
judicial approbation, then the door is open to a procedure which, 
if adopted as a common procedure, could do irreparable harm for 
many appellants who are not represented by counsel and generally 
unaware of the procedural requirement for appeal. 
If this Court is to hold that the issuance of a certificate 
is a "decision" of the State Engineer, it should be treated as 
such and the applicant who received a certificate should be ad-
vised of the time limits for appeal. 
B. Another item that the Court does not address is the 
problem which will occur if protestants should not receive notice 
of the issuance of a certificate of appropriation to. another par-
ty. As the practice now stands, the protectant does not receive 
notice of the issuance of a certificate. The Court in this case 
apparently finds that practice to be acceptable. The result is 
that there are now different standards of notice for a "Memoran-
dum Decision" and a "Certificate of Appropriation," yet they 
both, by reason of this decision , constitute a "decision" that 
is governed by the provisions of §73-3-14 and &73-3-15, Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953. 
Appellants have responded to this argument by saying that if 
a protestant is concerned about the issuance of a certificate of 
appropriation, he can follow it up on his own. Such reasoning 
cuts both ways and can easily be applied to the "Memorandum De-
cision" issued by the State Engineer. If the protestant is con-
cerned about another party's application, he can also easily fol-
low it up on his own to determine what the State Engineer's "de-
cision" is on that particular application. 
Respondent believes this decision confuses the rule by es-
tablishing a double standard of notice. The approval of a pro-
cedure that does not require notice flies in the teeth of what we 
commonly think of as due process. Respondent believes the Court 
should clarify these issues if it is to find that the issuance of 
a certificate of appropriation has the same status as a "Memoran-
dum Decision" of the State Engineer. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 
THAT GOVERN THIS CASE. 
Respondent has previously stated in this brief that it never 
received notice of the issuance of Certificate No. 3686. Since 
notice of receipt is a disputed fact, the equitable principles of 
estoppel and mutual mistake clearly provide a sound basis for 
trial in the district court. The district court was correct in 
reaching its conclusion regarding the same question. 
Respondent also requests the Court to more closely scrutinize 
the cases of Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938) 
and United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974). Assuming 
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that this Court finds that the issuance of a certificate is a 
"decision11 of the State Engineer (which respondent vigorougly 
opposes; see page 10 of respondent's prior brief), both cases 
explicitely state that an action to review a "decision" of the 
State Engineer can subsequently be brought even after the 60-day 
review period has passed. The logic and reasoning in those cases 
are directly applicable to the instant case. 
The legislative intent of §73-3-14 and §73-3-15, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, was not to bar all actions brought after the 60-
day review period, but only to prevent delaying and harrassing 
actions that would inhibit appropriators and applicants from try-
ing to perfect their rights. There always remains an independent 
action for injunctive relief if someone interfers with another 
party's rights. That is the law as expressed in Eardley v. Terry, 
supra. The prejudicial delaying action of the State Engineer and 
his subsequent taking of the City's water gives Provo City valid 
grounds to have its certificate reviewed by a court of equity. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT PRESENTS 
A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AND WHICH ISSUE IS OF UNIQUE PUBLIC 
INTEREST. 
This Court has, in effect, rendered summary judgment in a 
cause that includes a multitude of factual issues that are in 
dispute. With respect to motions to dismiss, it is commonly un-
derstood that a complaint should only be dismissed when "it ap-
pears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief". Con-
ley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 
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84 (1957). The applicable law is also found in 61 Am.Jur.2d, 
Pleading, §227. 
[T]he motion will be denied if the Court is 
called on to dispose of issues of fact rais-
ed by the pleadings in advance of a hearing 
in due course. In other words, where a vital 
and undetermined issue of fact is presented 
by the pleadings, a judgment should not be 
permitted to rest on an issue of law alone 
• • • In other words, all facts alleged and 
all the reasonable inferences and implica-
tions therefrom are to be considered most 
strongly in favor of the plaintiff since the 
remedy sought by the defendant is a drastic 
one. (emphasis added) 
This Court has continually expressed its reluctance to ren-
der summary judgment when a justiciable issue is before it, as 
stated in Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, _____ Utah 2d ____: 
It is not the purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure to judge the credibility 
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, 
or the weight of evidence. Neither is it 
to deny parties the right to a trial to re-
solve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose 
is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense 
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts 
as asserted by the party ruled against, he 
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when 
it so appears, is the court justified in re-
fusing such a party the opportunity of pre-
senting his evidence and attempting to per-
suade the fact trier to his views. Converse-
ly, if there is any dispute as to any issue, 
material to the settlement of the controver-
sy, the summary judgment should not be granted. 
In addition to the factual issues that must be resolved, 
this case presents an issue of significant public importance. 
Public policy as expressed by the Utah State Constitution, Arti-
cle XI, §6, states that the municipalities are to keep their wa-
ter and are prohibited from disposing of their water in any way. 
The obvious reason for such a provision in the constitution is to 
protect the fundamental life needs and the dollar investments 
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of the citizens* Similar purposes are accomplished on the State 
and Federal level by principles of sovereignity and immunity. 
Yet this Court, in this decision, and the State Engineer have 
developed means to work a forfeiture of Provo Cityfs water right 
and are quick to deprive the citizens of their assets and invest-
ments without allowing Provo City to present its case. The sig-
nificance of this right, the public interest involved, and the 
obvious justiciable issue should dictate that this Court follow 
its previous opinions in respect to summary judgment. The de-
cision in this case is even more difficult to understand when the 
Supreme Court allows summary judgment vis-a-vis the finding of 
justiciable fact by the lower and trial court, which is tradi-
tionally the fact-finding court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has erred in assuming facts of notice that are not 
in the record and that are denied by the respondent. This is 
clearly improper on a motion to dismiss. The Court has also 
disregarded its own prior decisions by not considering the equi-
table principles inherent in controversies concerning water 
rights and disputed issues of fact. The only practical approach 
to the cause before this Court is to allow the respondent to show 
the trial court where the State Engineer erred in his calcula-
tions and in the issuance of Certificate of Appropriation No. 
3686. Respondent requests this cause be remanded for such a 
hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J^L <L*&» 
J£C£SON HOWARD^ f o r : 
WARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Cttornevs for Respondent 
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